A Failure to Communicate

December 5, 1945

Lost in The Bermuda Triangle Part 5

That Flight 19 completed the first part of their navigation assignment and the glide-bombing task at Chicken Rocks we can be fairly certain. And to give you a better geographical perspective of the target practice area, those shoals and rocks are located about 16 miles north by northeast of North Bimini Island.

Following their bombing and strafing exercise Flight 19 was to continue east on the course of 091 degrees and at mile 67 the flight’s location would be northwest of the Berry Island chain and north of Great Harbor. At that point they should turn left and take a heading approximately north-by-north northwest on a course of 346 degrees for 73 miles. Following that heading they would cross the Grand Bahama Island and at mile 73 they would be over open waters some 21 miles west by northwest of the western tip of Little Abaco Island.

Then making their final turn for home they would take a heading of 241 degrees. Then some 45 miles later they would cross West End Point of the Grand Bahama Island and had they continued along that path they would arrive back at NAS Ft. Lauderdale sometime after 5:00 pm.

That was the course laid out for Flight 19’s training exercise that afternoon and it was followed as far as Chicken Rocks. Exactly what happened after they completed their bombing and strafing exercise is up to interpretation.

During the inquiry a fishing boat captain seemed to confirm the timing at Chicken Rocks when he told of seeing 3 or 4 planes flying east at about 3:00 o’clock in the afternoon.

Taking the fishing boat captain at his word, he said 3 or 4 not 4 or 5. He said he saw 3 or possibly 4 planes grouped together. Of course it’s always possible that one plane could be hidden behind another but assuming that he was correct that there were only 3 or 4, where was the other plane? Could that have been a distraction and added time to the second part of that first leg of the navigation problem? If they had to go in search of the wayward plane and then resume the course of 091 degrees how far off course would that have put them in relation to their starting point? Was cross winds or head winds a factor?

During the hearings it was determined that it was around 3:40 when various monitoring stations discovered that something was wrong with Flight 19. Had the flight been on schedule at 3:40 they should have been some 10 or 12 minutes into the north course, which would have put them over open waters. At that time chatter coming from Flight 19, transmitting on 4805 kc, someone asked Powers, one of the student pilots, what his compass read. Powers then said, “We must have got lost on that last turn.”

It would be reasonable to assume that the reference to “that last turn” was their turn to the north on the course of 346 degrees. The next question is, since they should have been over open waters at that point, how did they know that they were lost? I suspect they had drifted south of the 091 course and were more than likely flying over the eastern part of the Great Bahama Bank.

However, before we look at the geography I’d like to go back to the arrival of Lt. Charles Taylor at the Ft. Lauderdale NAS Operations office. Taylor asked the duty officer to replace him on the flight and was turned down. The hearings gave no satisfactory answer so we are left to speculate. The man was troubled by something, probably something out of his past. Now Taylor had just transferred to NAS Ft. Lauderdale from NAS Miami where he had flown many hours in and around the Florida Keys. Perhaps he was not comfortable flying into a new area, the Bahamas, or might he have possibly bought into the Bermuda Triangle syndrome. Could he have had a premonition about Flight 19 getting lost? If that was the case and the fear factor kicked in, it might give us some insight into Taylor’s state of mind. If he was in a near panic and Flight 19 had gotten down into the north end of the Berry Island chain, he could have possibly confused one of those islands with one similar to an island he had seen in the Keys.

To assist in the Power’s dilemma Lt. Cox, Fox Tare 74 heard the call and asked the person calling Powers to identify themselves. Fox Tare 28 came on the air and said both of his compasses were out, said he was trying to find Ft. Lauderdale, that he was over land, but it was broken. He also said, “I’m sure I’m in the Keys, but I don’t know how far down and don’t know how to get to Ft. Lauderdale.”

Had Taylor been completely coherent and actually thought he was in the Keys you would think he could identify the land he was flying over. After all he had flown many hours in the area while based at NAS Miami. And by extension he should have known that Ft. Lauderdale was just north of his old base.

Of course the talk about the compass problem might be valid for a number of reasons, instrument installation, calibration or something other than a man made error. It could be a more basic problem, the area itself is known to have a built in variation between true north and magnetic north. But assuming the flyers had their charts they would have to know that at the end of that first leg they needed to make a turn to the left, and that would simply put the sun on their port wing. Of course that is logical thinking and from the talk coming from the pilots of Flight 19 logic, at some point, had taken a powder.

To be continued)

Hurricane Hunters and Lost in the Bermuda Triangle Amazon book page Click Here

Tom Barnes -- Actor, Writer and Hurricane Hunter.

Check out my website for books, blogs, western legends, a literary icon, reviews and interviews. Also my novels The Goring Collection and Doc Holliday’s Road to Tombstone along with a non fiction remembrance of The Hurricane Hunters and Lost in the Bermuda Triangle.

www.tombarnes39.com

www.RocktheTower.com

http://TheHurricaneHunter.blogspot.com

A Failure to Communicate

December 5, 1945

Lost in The Bermuda Triangle Part 5

That Flight 19 completed the first part of their navigation assignment and the glide-bombing task at Chicken Rocks we can be fairly certain. And to give you a better geographical perspective of the target practice area, those shoals and rocks are located about 16 miles north by northeast of North Bimini Island.

Following their bombing and strafing exercise Flight 19 was to continue east on the course of 091 degrees and at mile 67 the flight’s location would be northwest of the Berry Island chain and north of Great Harbor. At that point they should turn left and take a heading approximately north-by-north northwest on a course of 346 degrees for 73 miles. Following that heading they would cross the Grand Bahama Island and at mile 73 they would be over open waters some 21 miles west by northwest of the western tip of Little Abaco Island.

Then making their final turn for home they would take a heading of 241 degrees. Then some 45 miles later they would cross West End Point of the Grand Bahama Island and had they continued along that path they would arrive back at NAS Ft. Lauderdale sometime after 5:00 pm.

That was the course laid out for Flight 19’s training exercise that afternoon and it was followed as far as Chicken Rocks. Exactly what happened after they completed their bombing and strafing exercise is up to interpretation.

During the inquiry a fishing boat captain seemed to confirm the timing at Chicken Rocks when he told of seeing 3 or 4 planes flying east at about 3:00 o’clock in the afternoon.

Taking the fishing boat captain at his word, he said 3 or 4 not 4 or 5. He said he saw 3 or possibly 4 planes grouped together. Of course it’s always possible that one plane could be hidden behind another but assuming that he was correct that there were only 3 or 4, where was the other plane? Could that have been a distraction and added time to the second part of that first leg of the navigation problem? If they had to go in search of the wayward plane and then resume the course of 091 degrees how far off course would that have put them in relation to their starting point? Was cross winds or head winds a factor?

During the hearings it was determined that it was around 3:40 when various monitoring stations discovered that something was wrong with Flight 19. Had the flight been on schedule at 3:40 they should have been some 10 or 12 minutes into the north course, which would have put them over open waters. At that time chatter coming from Flight 19, transmitting on 4805 kc, someone asked Powers, one of the student pilots, what his compass read. Powers then said, “We must have got lost on that last turn.”

It would be reasonable to assume that the reference to “that last turn” was their turn to the north on the course of 346 degrees. The next question is, since they should have been over open waters at that point, how did they know that they were lost? I suspect they had drifted south of the 091 course and were more than likely flying over the eastern part of the Great Bahama Bank.

However, before we look at the geography I’d like to go back to the arrival of Lt. Charles Taylor at the Ft. Lauderdale NAS Operations office. Taylor asked the duty officer to replace him on the flight and was turned down. The hearings gave no satisfactory answer so we are left to speculate. The man was troubled by something, probably something out of his past. Now Taylor had just transferred to NAS Ft. Lauderdale from NAS Miami where he had flown many hours in and around the Florida Keys. Perhaps he was not comfortable flying into a new area, the Bahamas, or might he have possibly bought into the Bermuda Triangle syndrome. Could he have had a premonition about Flight 19 getting lost? If that was the case and the fear factor kicked in, it might give us some insight into Taylor’s state of mind. If he was in a near panic and Flight 19 had gotten down into the north end of the Berry Island chain, he could have possibly confused one of those islands with one similar to an island he had seen in the Keys.

To assist in the Power’s dilemma Lt. Cox, Fox Tare 74 heard the call and asked the person calling Powers to identify themselves. Fox Tare 28 came on the air and said both of his compasses were out, said he was trying to find Ft. Lauderdale, that he was over land, but it was broken. He also said, “I’m sure I’m in the Keys, but I don’t know how far down and don’t know how to get to Ft. Lauderdale.”

Had Taylor been completely coherent and actually thought he was in the Keys you would think he could identify the land he was flying over. After all he had flown many hours in the area while based at NAS Miami. And by extension he should have known that Ft. Lauderdale was just north of his old base.

Of course the talk about the compass problem might be valid for a number of reasons, instrument installation, calibration or something other than a man made error. It could be a more basic problem, the area itself is known to have a built in variation between true north and magnetic north. But assuming the flyers had their charts they would have to know that at the end of that first leg they needed to make a turn to the left, and that would simply put the sun on their port wing. Of course that is logical thinking and from the talk coming from the pilots of Flight 19 logic, at some point, had taken a powder.

To be continued)

Hurricane Hunters and Lost in the Bermuda Triangle Amazon book page Click Here

Tom Barnes -- Actor, Writer and Hurricane Hunter.

Check out my website for books, blogs, western legends, a literary icon, reviews and interviews. Also my novels The Goring Collection and Doc Holliday’s Road to Tombstone along with a non fiction remembrance of The Hurricane Hunters and Lost in the Bermuda Triangle.

www.tombarnes39.com

www.RocktheTower.com

http://TheHurricaneHunter.blogspot.com

Flight 19 Lost, Scramble a Rescue Team

December 5, 1945
Lost in The Bermuda Triangle Part 4
At 5:50 pm several land based stations had triangulated Flight 19's position as being well off the coast of Florida but the weak radio reception and interference from radio stations in Cuba meant neither the pilots or the stations could be certain of that information.
Fox Tare 28 asked for another weather check at about 6:20 and not long after that, in his last decipherable transmission, he was heard asking his colleagues to close formation. He informed them they would need to ditch unless they reached land in the next few minutes. He advised the other pilots that when the first plane dropped below ten gallons of fuel they would all descend together. That was the last message heard from any of the members of Flight 19.
Earlier in the afternoon when it became obvious the flight was indeed lost, numerous air bases, aircraft and Coast Guard Vessels were alerted and dispatched to search for the Avengers and guide them back if they could locate them. A PBM-5 Martin Mariner took off at 7:37 pm with a crew of 13 from Banana River Air Station at Cocoa Beach to join the search. The PBM radioed a routine message several minutes after takeoff, but was never heard from again. The plane apparently exploded 23 minutes after takeoff and at 7:50 pm a tanker reported seeing a mid-air explosion then flames leaping 120 ft high and burning. They searched the area for survivors, but found none.
Navy investigators spent months examining thousands of pages of testimony from people involved and anyone that could shed light into the disappearance of Flight 19 and the Mariner. They concluded that the Flight 19 Avengers became lost and ditched in rough seas after running out of fuel, and that the Mariner exploded in mid-air, possibly caused by a fuel fume buildup inside the cabin of the plane.
Aircraft and ships carried out what has been described as one of the most rigorous searches in history for the Flight 19 Avengers and the Mariner, but without success.
Back at the NAS Ft. Lauderdale operations office three men, the duty officer, flight operations officer and Lt. Cox stood around talking. In order to put the whole story into context it would be good if we had the names of the duty officer and flight operations officer, but unfortunately we do not. After all the investigations, inquiries and hearings the identity of two of the principles in the case are still unknown to us.
Why their names were not made prominent in the final report is a question. And since that is the case, it’s just possible that somewhere earlier in the hearings those two names were set aside and didn’t reappear in the final report. Again that’s just a guess, but I suspect that some on that the panel of judges, hearing the case, believed that two out of those three officers present at the operations office that afternoon were culpable to some degree. On the surface it might be concluded that the flight operations officer and duty officer were both slow to react to the current events – but when all the evidence came out in court would their slow reactions be reasoned to be prudence or negligence? I suspect that JAG probably figured that prosecuting the case would end up in a draw, but even so the proceedings alone might tarnish the reputations and careers of the two officers involved.
On the other hand the third officer, Lt. Cox first known as Fox Tare 74, was a man of action and from the time he heard that garbled radio message between pilots of Flight 19 he was concerned enough to put out a blind radio call saying, “This is Fox Tare 74. Will the plane or boat calling Powers please identify yourself so someone can help you.” Then with the tenacity of a bulldog he didn’t let go while he was trying to piece the problem together in the air or when he returned to base and talked to his colleagues in the operations office.
Every article written about Flight 19 is done in hindsight and in most cases there is an element of speculation. I’m going to weigh in on the conversation and add my two cents to the dialogue. It is my belief that Lt. Cox, Fox Tare 74, reacted a lot like Lt. Krieger would have. And while I am also guessing, with my personal experience, I do have a point of reference.
To give you some idea about Lt. Krieger’s personality and also illustrate the typical finish to a bombing and strafing exercise over those same Rocks I’ll recount something that happened and I observed from my gun turret. After we had completed our bombing and strafing assignments the skipper, in order to regroup for the next leg of our course said, “Flight 14 will climb to 3, 000 feet and rendezvous over the Rocks.”
We climbed out to 3,000 feet and from our position we could look down and see that several planes had not followed. The skipper opened his mike and in an irate tone said, “Flight 14 from Flight 14 leader, I gave an order to rendezvous over the Rocks at 3,000 feet. And in case you don’t understand what rendezvous means, I’ll tell you. It’s a French word that means come together. Now come on up and join me. We need to reform before we can move on to the next leg of our assignment.”
Now chances are that was about the situation Flight 19 found itself in following their bombing and strafing run at Chicken Rocks on the afternoon of December 5, 1945.
The question is, who was in charge? Was it Taylor, Powers or one of the other students that made the call for Flight 19 to reassemble and continue on a course of 091 degrees for the next 67 miles?
(To be continued)

Hurricane Hunters and Lost in the Bermuda Triangle Amazon book page Click Here

Tom Barnes -- Actor, Writer and Hurricane Hunter.
Check out my website for books, blogs, western legends, a literary icon, reviews and interviews. Also my novels The Goring Collection and Doc Holliday’s Road to Tombstone along with a non fiction remembrance of The Hurricane Hunters and Lost in the Bermuda Triangle.
www.tombarnes39.com
www.RocktheTower.com
http://TheHurricaneHunter.blogspot.com

Flight 19 Leader Charts Deadly Course

December 5, 1945
Lt. Cox' words fall on deaf ears at Ft. Lauderdale Operations Office.

Upon returning to Fort Lauderdale, Fox Tare 74’s pilot, Lt. Robert Cox, went to the operations office and related as much as he could remember of the conversations with Flight 19 to the duty officer and requested permission to take the ready standby aircraft out to search for the flight. When he got no answer, he then made the same request to the flight operations officer who replied, "Very definitely, no."
The three officers continued to discuss the problem and they figured a key factor was the time of Fox Tare 28’s first transmission indicating that he was lost had occurred at 4:00 o’clock. They knew by that fact that the leader could not possibly have gone on more than one leg of his navigation problem and still gotten to the Keys by 4:00 o’clock. Then studying a wall map of the area the three officers figured it was likely that Flight 19 was lost somewhere near the Great Bahama Bank and not the Keys.
The duty officer then called Air Sea Rescue to instruct Fox Tare 28 to fly 270 degrees and simply fly towards the sun, taking the part about wild compass readings out of play. Of course that was standard procedure for planes lost off the East Coast of Florida and it was drummed into all students. However, the fact that the Flight 19 leader believed he was over the Keys makes those instructions sound, at least in his mind, like he would be flying out into the Gulf of Mexico.
It was apparent though that at least one of the student pilots didn’t believe they were in the Keys and remembered that general rule, because Air Sea Rescue picked up a message that was said to be strident in tone that, “If we fly 270 degrees we could hit land.”
At 4:39 pm, the Ft. Lauderdale operations officer contacted Air Sea Rescue a second time and explained further that his operations officers believed that Flight 19 must be lost over the Great Bahama Bank. His plan was to dispatch the Lauderdale standby plane, guarding 4805 kc, on course 075 degrees to try to contact Flight 19. And if the communications improved during that flight it would be a good indication that they were closing the distance and that their location theory was sound.
At 4:45 pm, Fox Tare 28 announced, "We are heading 030 degrees for 45 minutes, then we will fly north to make sure we are not over the Gulf of Mexico."
None of the ground listening stations had made contact or fixed any useful bearings on Flight 19, and IFF got no response either. The lost flight was asked to broadcast continuously on 4805 kc. The message was not responded to but a short time later when asked to switch to 3000 kc, the search and rescue frequency, Fox Tare 28 yelled, "I cannot switch frequencies. I must keep my planes intact."
There were no transmissions for almost ten minutes when suddenly Fox Tare 28 opened his mike and said, "Change course to 090 degrees for 10 minutes." Almost immediately after that message at least two of the students adamantly disagreed with their leader. They were sure that they were not over the Keys and let it be known. "Dammit, if we could just fly west we would get home” the first voice said.
“Head west, dammit," barked the second voice.
Some time after the strident dissent of the students and the fact that the last two course corrections by Lt. Taylor had not resulted in spotting land at 5:16 pm, Fox Tare 28 opened his mike and called out, “We’ll take a heading of 270 degrees until we hit the beach or run out of gas."
To this day, it appears that geography and navigation did not come naturally to Lt. Taylor for he was far from the Florida Keys. We have to assume that the islands Taylor mentioned must have been some where in the Bahamas. And Taylor’s actions, following his own instinct were actually guiding the flight farther and farther off course. During that time the weather was deteriorating and radio contact became more intermittent, the five planes were probably in one of two areas. They were in that wide expanse of ocean south of Grand Bahama Island or they had somehow gone farther north and got past Little Abaco Island and were heading out into the Atlantic.
At about 5:15 pm Lieutenant Taylor said he was flying west and would do so for the time being, but at the same time worried that they were running out of gas. He requested a weather check at 5:24.
Near that same time back in the NAS operations office weather reports indicating a bad turn in the weather, along with that last transmission from Flight 19 advising that they would be flying west, prompted the duty officer to indicate at 5:36 pm, that they had missed the window of opportunity to send the standby plane out to join the search.
(To be continued)
Hurricane Hunters and Lost in the Bermuda Triangle Amazon book page Click Here

Tom Barnes -- Actor, Writer and Hurricane Hunter.
Check out my website for books, blogs, western legends, a literary icon, reviews and interviews. Also my novels Tungee's Gold, The Goring Collection and Doc Holliday’s Road to Tombstone along with a non fiction remembrance of The Hurricane Hunters and Lost in the Bermuda Triangle.
www.tombarnes39.com
www.RocktheTower.com
http://TheHurricaneHunter.blogspot.com

Flight 19 -- Compass and Navigation Problem

December 5, 1945
Ft Lauderdale Naval Air Station
Assuming Flight 19 continued on the prescribed course of 091 for 67 miles they would have made their turn to the north on course 346 at approximately 3:25 pm. Now if they were on course and on time when they made that turn, by 3:40 pm they should have been coming up on Grand Bahama Island.
However, at about 3:40 Fox Tare 74, a senior flight instructor at Ft. Lauderdale, was moving his training squadron into formation near the Ft. Lauderdale airfield when he heard what he believed to be a distress call from a boat or aircraft. One man was transmitting on 4805 kc to Powers, which happened to be the name of one of the Flight 19 students. The transmissions were broken up, but the voice seemed to be asking Powers what his compass read. There was no answer until someone, possibly Powers, said, "I don't know where we are. We must have got lost after that last turn."
During the next fifteen minutes garbled and broken radio messages could be heard between the pilots of Flight 19. Adding to the poor reception of the voice transmissions was normal atmospheric conditions along with a Cuban radio station using a frequency close to 4805. In any event at some point after the student leader’s “lost” transmission Lt. Taylor took over the lead position of Flight 19.
Fox Tare 74 was monitoring the garbled conversation and became concerned enough to put out a blind transmission. “This is Fox Tare 74, will the plane or boat calling Powers please identify yourself so someone can help you.”
He got no response to that call, but a few moments later a voice came on the air asking, “Are there any suggestions?”
Fox Tare 74 tried again, and the voice was identified as Fox Tare 28.
Fox Tare 74 asked, “Fox Tare 28 Are you in trouble?”
“Both my compasses are out and I’m trying to find Ft. Lauderdale, Florida. I’m over land, but it’s broken. I’m sure I’m in the Keys but I don’t know how far down and I don’t know how to get to Ft. Lauderdale," said the unsure voice of Flight 19’s leader.
“Fox Tare 74 to Fox Tare 28 if you are in the Keys put the sun on your port wing and just fly up the coast until you get to Miami. Ft. Lauderdale is 20 miles farther, your first port after Miami. The air station is directly on your left from the port."
After a few moments Fox Tare 74 asked, "What is your present altitude? I will fly south and meet you."
Fox Tare 28 replied, "I know where I am now. I’m at 2300 feet, don't come after me."
Fox Tare 74 was not convinced. "Roger, you're at 2300 feet. Coming to meet you anyhow."
Minutes later, Fox Tare 28 said, "We have just passed over a small island. We have no other land in sight."
Most listening stations in the area had picked up on the possible problem and were riveted to the conversation, and most had serious doubts about Fox Tare 28’s actual location.
Fox Tare 28 opened his mike and asked, "Can you have Miami or someone turn on their radar gear and pick us up? We don't seem to be getting far. We were out on a navigation hop and on the second leg I thought they were going wrong, so I took over and was flying them back to the right position. But I'm sure, now, that neither one of my compasses is working."
Fox Tare 74 said, “Turn on your emergency IFF gear, or do you have it on?"
Fox Tare 28 said, “I did not, but I now have on emergency IFF. Does anyone in the area have a radar screen that could pick us up?"
At that point Air Sea Rescue was aware of the problem and making plans to assist in locating Flight 19. Ft. Lauderdale Operations notified NAS Miami and asked them and other stations to attempt to pick up the lost flight on radar or IFF signal with their direction finders.
Air Sea Rescue put out a call for all merchant ships in the area to be alert to Flight 19’s problem. Stand by Coast Guard vessels were told to prepare to put to sea. But there were delays in implementing the plan and Teletype communication with several locations was out and radio fixes were hampered by static and interference from the Spanish speaking broadcast stations from Cuba.

At 4:28, Air Sea Rescue called Fox Tare 28 and suggested that another plane in the flight with a good compass take over the lead. Fox Tare 28 gave a Roger, but from ground observers listening to fragmentary messages between the flight leader and the students the talk was only about their estimated position and heading. But it would appear from those conversations that no other plane was ever designated to take over the lead.
During that same period Fox Tare 74 was losing his signal and said, “Fox Tare 28 your transmissions are fading. What is your altitude?"
Fox Tare 28 transmitted a weak signal and said, "I'm at 4500 feet."
Fox Tare 74 had no further contact with Flight 19, but on his return flight to base he observed a very rough sea covered with white caps and streamers. The surface winds were westerly, at about 22 knots, and visibility was very good in all directions except directly west. That was probably a normal condition since one would be looking into the sun through shifting cloud formations.
(To be continued)
Hurricane Hunters and Lost in the Bermuda Triangle Amazon book page Click Here

Tom Barnes -- Actor, Writer and Hurricane Hunter.
Check out my website for books, blogs, western legends, a literary icon, reviews and interviews. Also my novels Tungee's Gold, The Goring Collection and Doc Holliday’s Road to Tombstone along with a non fiction remembrance of The Hurricane Hunters and Lost in the Bermuda Triangle.
www.tombarnes39.com
www.RocktheTower.com
http://TheHurricaneHunter.blogspot.com

Flight 19 -- Navigation, Bombing and Strafing

December 5, 1945
Ft Lauderdale Naval Air Station

Lt. Charles Taylor Late for Flight 19 Briefing
Sixty five years ago today and the tragedy of Flight 19 is still a subject of interest. We'll follow Flight 19 into the Bermuda Triangle using radio transmissions from the flight, hearing records and witness testimony along with some questions that were not asked at the inquiry.
December 5, 1945
NAS Ft. Lauderdale, Florida
Flight 19 was to be a routine navigation, bombing and strafing exercise as part of the student pilot’s and aircrew’s operational training schedule. The flight consisted of five planes and 14 navy and Marine Corps aviators, five pilots, and nine radiomen or gunners. The planes were TBM Avengers, large single-engine torpedo bombers. Four of the planes were piloted by student pilots and the fifth by the flight instructor and leader, Navy Lt. Charles Taylor.
Prior to the flight, each plane went through a full preflight inspection that included engine, aircraft, fuel, safety equipment and ordnance, which included live ammunition and bombs.
The student pilots and air crewmen stood around the operations office waiting for their flight instructor to show up. As the clock ticked past 1:10 pm and still no instructor the crews began to show anxiety, knowing that they were going to be late. Their takeoff time was set for 1:45 pm and they still hadn’t had their briefing. At 1:15 Lt. Charles Taylor arrived and immediately asked the aviation training duty officer to find another instructor to take his place. Taylor gave no particular reason; he just stated simply that he did not want to take the flight out. His request was denied; and he was told that no relief was available.
Taylor didn’t plead his case further and reluctantly accepted the duty officer’s decision. Then once it was settled that he would be leading the flight, the crews picked up their life jackets and parachutes and trooped over to the briefing room. As soon as they settled into their chairs the briefing officer told them that today’s training flight would include a bombing and strafing exercise. The weather reports in the area were favorable and the sea was moderate to rough. The briefing officer stood beside a chalkboard and drew as he explained the navigation problem. They would depart NAS Ft. Lauderdale and take an easterly heading of 091 degrees for a distance of 56 miles to Hens and Chickens Shoals where they would practice low level bombing and strafing. Once the bombing exercise was completed they would continue on course 091 for 67 miles. They would then turn north and take a course of 346 degrees and fly for 73 miles. The third leg of the course would take them on a west-southwest heading of 241 degrees for a distance of 120 miles, which would complete the triangle and bring them back to NAS Ft. Lauderdale.

At 2:00 pm the pilots and crews boarded their planes, started their engines and by 2:10 pm the flight was in the air, led by one of the students. The instructor whose call sign was Fox Tare 28 stayed behind the other planes in a tracking position. Estimated Time of Arrival back at base was 5:23 pm. All five planes had enough fuel to remain aloft for five to five-and-a-half hours.
Flight 19 apparently arrived at their first objective, the bombing and strafing range located at Hens and Chickens Shoals, commonly called Chicken Rocks. That range was only 56 miles from Fort Lauderdale, and at normal cruising speed they would arrive at the Rocks in about 20 minutes. Thirty minutes was the normal time for the bombing and strafing exercise. After that target practice was completed they would regroup and then continue on the final 67 miles of the first leg.
Ft. Lauderdale tower picked up a conversation from Flight 19 near the end of the bomb exercise when someone said, "I've got one more bomb."
A second voice stated, "Go ahead and drop it".
That short report was taken down since it was general practice for base and other aircraft in the area to monitor radio conversations between the pilots. The short message was normal and a good sign that the bombing and strafing operation was completed successfully.
(To be Continued)

The Hurricane Hunters and Lost in the Bermuda Triangle Amazon book page Click Here

Tom Barnes -- Actor, Writer and Hurricane Hunter.
Check out my website for books, blogs, western legends, a literary icon, reviews and interviews. Also my novels Tungee's Gold, The Goring Collection and Doc Holliday’s Road to Tombstone along with a non fiction remembrance of The Hurricane Hunters and Lost in the Bermuda Triangle.
www.tombarnes39.com
www.RocktheTower.com
http://TheHurricaneHunter.blogspot.com

The Bermuda Triangle and Flight 19 Part One

This Week
2010 Hurricane Season Ended Nov 30, 2010
The Bermuda Triangle:
Flight 19 Part 1
Overview of the Bermuda Triangle
Hundreds of stories have been told about the Bermuda Triangle, sometimes called The Devils Triangle. That area of strange happenings begins at Bermuda and runs south to Puerto Rico, east to South Florida and back to Bermuda. Some expand that area to include the Outer Banks off North Carolina and Virginia. Of course those strange happenings inside the triangle didn’t begin in the 20th Century. They go back to at least 1492 when Christopher Columbus and his three ships the Nina, Pinta and Santa Maria sailed through that area. Words from Columbus’s journal were that his compass went haywire and his crew saw strange lights in the sky. Those few words written in the Christopher Columbus journal might have been the beginning of what has now become the mystique of the Bermuda Triangle.
There are tales about missing vessels, missing airplanes and ghost ships – enough to chill the souls of the faint hearted. And writings on the subject range from paranormal, voodoo and supernatural, UFO’s, a black hole somewhere in the Bahamas as well as
time warp and third dimension theories.
Of all the strange happenings within the Bermuda Triangle Flight 19 has probably drawn more notoriety to the area than any other tragedy. Flight 19’s 14 men and five planes coupled with the 13-man crew and the PBM Mariner sent out to search for the others were all lost without a trace.
Those tragic losses immediately led to speculation into the paranormal possibilities of that fateful day. And the mystery of the Bermuda Triangle grew in proportion to the unanswered questions produced by subsequent investigations and hearings.
There is no doubt in my mind that prior to the hurricane warning system, started in 1945, the Bermuda Triangle got its share of unannounced hurricanes, that ripped through the area with no warning to inhabitants of the islands or ships at sea. Sea captains and crews new to the area were not capable of reading signs of looming danger such as sea swells, wind changes, cloud formations or barometric pressures, whereas the old seafaring skipper could generally read those markers and steer his ship out of harms way.
Of course when the warning system went into effect land bases as well as ships at sea were given warning bulletins advising of dangerous hurricanes their locations and movement directions. The system, while not perfect, at least, gives everyone a fighting chance to take evasive action of some kind.
There are several physical elements that should be considered when looking into a strange happening or disappearance inside the Bermuda Triangle. Here are three and there are others: The Sargasso Sea, the Gulf Stream and other Atlantic currents as well as the variation in compass readings between true north and magnetic north. And while those three natural problems won’t answer all the questions, they should be considered as part of all investigations into happenings inside the Bermuda Triangle.
The Sargasso Sea is named for saragassum a type of seaweed that covers the whole area and floats on or near the surface. The saragassum covered area of the Atlantic remains placid while the Gulf Stream and other currents swirl around its edges. How this strange bed of seaweed adapted to this off shore area baffles oceanographers as well as other scientists and it remains a mystery to this day.
This quiet sea attracts surface vessels both manned and unmanned. Sailing vessels have been becalmed and could not move. Small powerboats have had their propellers caught up in the seaweed. Some boats were eventually abandoned when the owner could not extricate the boat from the tangled seaweed. Derelict ships have been spotted and boarded to find no sign of life. Salvage crews have boarded and gotten the ship under weigh only to disappear themselves before reaching safe harbor.
Countless theories explaining the many disappearances have been offered throughout history, but the most practical seems to be environmental or possible human error. The majority of strange happenings within the Bermuda Triangle can be attributed to the area’s unique environmental features. It is important to note that the Bermuda Triangle is one of two places on earth that a magnetic compass does point toward true north. Normally it points toward magnetic north and the difference between the two readings can be as much as 20 degrees. If that compass variation is not understood and compensated for, calculations could put the ship or plane many miles off course.

The unpredictable Caribbean Atlantic weather pattern also has a role. Sudden thunderstorms, water spouts and hurricanes often spell disaster for pilots and mariners alike. Then one must consider the topography of the ocean floor that varies from extensive shoals around the islands to some of the deepest marine trenches in any ocean. The Gulf Stream is extremely swift and turbulent and produces strong currents over the numerous reefs, which means the ocean floor is constantly changing and that factor alone makes it capable of moving or even erasing evidence of a disaster.
But at the end of the day questions relating to ghost ships, missing crews and strange lights -- still go unanswered.

Mission and Schedule for Flight 19
December 5, 1945
NAS Ft. Lauderdale, Florida
Flight 19 was to be a routine navigation, bombing and strafing exercise as part of the student pilot’s and aircrew’s operational training schedule. The flight consisted of five planes and 14 navy and Marine Corps aviators, five pilots, and nine radiomen or gunners. The planes were TBM Avengers, large single-engine torpedo bombers. Four of the planes were piloted by student pilots and the fifth by the flight instructor and leader, Navy Lt. Charles Taylor.
Prior to the flight, each plane went through a full preflight inspection that included engine, aircraft, fuel, safety equipment and ordnance, which included live ammunition and bombs.
The student pilots and air crewmen stood around the operations office waiting for their flight instructor to show up. As the clock ticked past 1:10 pm and still no instructor the crews began to show anxiety, knowing that they were going to be late. Their takeoff time was set for 1:45 pm and they still hadn’t had their briefing. At 1:15 Lt. Charles Taylor arrived and immediately asked the aviation training duty officer to find another instructor to take his place. Taylor gave no particular reason; he just stated simply that he did not want to take the flight out. His request was denied; and he was told that no relief was available.
Taylor didn’t plead his case further and reluctantly accepted the duty officer’s decision. Then once it was settled that he would be leading the flight, the crews picked up their life jackets and parachutes and trooped over to the briefing room. As soon as they settled into their chairs the briefing officer told them that today’s training flight would include a bombing and strafing exercise. The weather reports in the area were favorable and the sea was moderate to rough. The briefing officer stood beside a chalkboard and drew as he explained the navigation problem. They would depart NAS Ft. Lauderdale and take an easterly heading of 091 degrees for a distance of 56 miles to Hens and Chickens Shoals where they would practice low level bombing and strafing. Once the bombing exercise was completed they would continue on course 091 for 67 miles. They would then turn north and take a course of 346 degrees and fly for 73 miles. The third leg of the course would take them on a west-southwest heading of 241 degrees for a distance of 120 miles, which would complete the triangle and bring them back to NAS Ft. Lauderdale.
(To be continued)

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